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The impact of religiosity and corruption on CSR 
reporting: The case of U.S. banks 
 




In this paper, we provide insights into CSR disclosure strategies by bringing to the fore the 
important role played by contextual factors. We examine the impact of religiosity upon the 
instigation of voluntary CSR disclosures and the way that corruption, a trans-systemic 
contextual feature, moderates this relationship. We draw upon social norm and institutional 
theories to illuminate the mechanisms through which contextual elements give rise to 
management disclosure strategies. Our investigation focuses on the U.S. context, where 
religiosity is of increasing importance and concentrates on the U.S. banking industry, whose 
impacts and ramifications are global. We demonstrate that the probability of a bank issuing a 
standalone CSR report is positively associated with the level of adherence to religious norms, 
a relationship which weakens in regions characterized by high levels of corruption. The 
implications of our findings are important for analysts and other market participants. 
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The role that social norms, and in particular religiosity (i.e., the intensity of adherence 
to religious promulgations), play in influencing economic activity has long been the subject of 
rigorous academic discussion (for instance see Coulter, Hermans & Parker 2013; Hopkins, 
Shanahan & Raymond 2014; Roberts & Yamane 2012). However, it is only relatively recently 
that scholars have shown an interest in understanding the effects of religiosity on core corporate 
matters and managerial decision making, through the means of academic debates, discussions 
(McPhail 2011; Minton, Johnson & Liu 2019) and empirical investigations (Hilary & Hui 
2009; Leventis, Dedoulis & Abdelsalam 2018). The latter has illuminated that adherence to 
religious norms is associated with cues and guidance which promote honesty, ethical behaviors 
and moral standards; thus, religious adherence is related to ethical business choices (Callen & 
Fang 2015; McGuire, Omer & Sharp 2012) and an increased corporate interest in socially- and 
environmentally-responsive policies (Angelidis & Ibrahim 2004; Harjoto & Rossi 2019). 
However, despite the insights offered (see also Dyreng, Mayew & Williams 2012), limited 
research has been conducted thus far to make sense of the relationship between religiosity and 
CSR reporting, which is commonly understood as a response to broader expectations of a more 
responsible, socially- and environmentally-conscious business attitude (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang & 
Yang 2011; Grougiou, Dedoulis & Leventis 2016). 
CSR activity, i.e., corporate practices that arguably improve societal well-being 
(Angelidis & Ibrahim 2004; Arnold & Valentin 2013; Ferrell, Harrison, Ferrell & Hair 2019; 
Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil & LaGore 2013), has gained great momentum in the last few decades. 
It is indicative that U.S. funds which prioritize CSR in their investment decisions managed 
about $9 trillion in assets in 2015 (www.ussif.org). Moreover, an increasing number of 
companies have started incorporating CSR reporting as a key component of their overall 
strategy (Mahoney et al. 2013). This practice has attracted significant academic interest 
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(Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Grougiou et al. 2016) and it has been interpreted as an administrative 
tool which contributes to securing broader stakeholder support (Hillenbrand, Money & 
Ghobadian 2013); managing diverse stakeholder pressures (Chantziaras, Dedoulis, Grougiou 
& Leventis 2017); legitimizing activities (Lee, Yoon & O'Donnell 2018), signaling out a firm’s 
commitment to local communities and the environment (Mahoney et al. 2013); and  attracting 
the interest of investors (Dhaliwal et al. 2011) and other socially-responsible parties (Patten & 
Zhao 2014). Researchers have also interpreted the disclosure of CSR reports as a strategy 
instigated by the ethical disposition of firm management and the sense of responsibility towards 
local societies and communities, i.e., as an integral aspect of modern business ethics (Cahan, 
Chen & Chen 2017; Melé & Fontrodona 2017). 
Against this background, we first investigate whether the level of adherence to religious 
norms in a geographical area systematically affects the corporate strategic decision to issue 
standalone CSR reports. Second, we expand our investigation to capture whether the 
aforementioned relationship is conditioned by the intensity of an important contextual element, 
namely corruption. We assess the impact of religious norms on CSR reporting against the level 
of corruption for two reasons: firstly, prior literature in political science, social psychology and 
economics has indicated the catalytic role of corruption in affecting the weight of influence 
that social norms have over individual and corporate behavior (Kubbe & Engelbert 2018). In 
relation to our study, the impact of corruption on religious norms is expected to be significant 
given that it prioritizes the pursuance of private gain through unethical means (Neu, Everett, 
Rahaman & Martinez 2013), which is in direct contradiction with fundamental religious values 
and promulgations (Chase 2014; Kubbe & Engelbert 2018). Secondly, corruption constitutes 
an important factor to consider since it is a contextual characteristic which remains present, 
albeit to different extents, across geographical areas and cultures (Arghyrou 2010; Barkemeyer, 
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Preuss & Lee 2015; Graycar & Monaghan 2015; Grossi & Pianezzi 2018; Islam, Dissanayake, 
Dellaportas & Haque 2018). 
In this light, we seek to make sense of whether institutional elements, which lie beyond 
the immediate control of managers, affect the instigation of CSR disclosures, a strategy through 
which firms respond to and interact with local communities and societies. Prior literature has 
focused mainly on the impact of formal institutions,1 corporate governance, and corporate and 
industry characteristics on CSR performance and disclosure. It is only relatively recently that 
scholars have begun to systematically investigate the impact of informal institutions (Harjoto 
& Rossi 2019; Jha & Cox 2015; Krishnamurti, Shams & Velayutham 2018). Thus, we extend 
this stream of research and focus on important contextual features. 
Our investigation focuses on the influential U.S. context, where religion remains 
salient2 (Chan-Serafin, Brief & George 2013; Keller, Smith & Smith 2007); and we select the 
banking sector, an influential industry which is crucial for global economic stability and 
development, and is yet largely under-researched (Jizi, Salama, Dixon & Stratling 2014). This 
sector constantly remains under the social microscope of value judgments (Ferry & Lehman 
2018) due to its dominant role and the social repercussions of its financial products and 
activities (Grougiou, Leventis, Dedoulis & Owusu-Ansah 2014); as evidenced by the case of 
the Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the ensuing credit crunch 
(Ballantine, Kelly & Larres in press). Additionally, some banking organizations have been 
publicly denounced for errant attitudes, which range from gender discrimination to the 
financing of companies involved in “sinful” activities (i.e., pornography, abortion, gambling 
                                                 
1 Formal institutions include written constitutions, laws, policies, rights and regulations enforced by official 
authorities. Informal institutions are (the usually unwritten) social norms, customs or traditions that shape thought 
and behavior (Leftwich & Sen 2010). 
2 In the U.S., there is a steady increase in religious denominations and churches, as reported in the Religious 
Congregations and Membership Studies, while some dogmas are becoming more politically influential (such as 
Εvangelical Christianity) (Norris & Inglehart 2004). 
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and alcohol). Most organized religions are firmly against such practices (Grougiou et al. 2016; 
Heal 2008) and, thus, have often expressed considerable public criticism of banking institutions 
(Wooden 2016). Operating within adverse contexts, and being a sector of great visibility, the 
banking industry has invested heavily in building a socially-responsible profile. This effort 
includes engagement in CSR activities and reporting (Grougiou et al. 2014) and the 
employment of strict principles to ensure adherence to sustainable investment activities (Chih, 
Chih & Chen 2010). Thus, we opted to examine banks since this it is an under-researched sector 
which is, however, influential for the growth and stability of the global economy, its activities 
have broad and severe social repercussions, and it is characterized by material investments in 
CSR. 
To investigate our research questions, we employ a sample of 214 U.S. listed banks for 
a 14-year estimation window (2002-2015), resulting in 1,785 firm-year observations.  We find 
that, in religious contexts where organizational alignment with business ethics, i.e. anti-
manipulative ethos, anti-opportunistic tactics and ethical judgment and morality, is highly 
valued by local communities, the propensity of a bank to issue CSR standalone reports 
significantly increases. We consider this to be the result of a two-tier mechanism at work. On 
one level, the prevailing community and social values concerning corporate ethics affect the 
attitudes of bank managers, who may then resort to instigating CSR disclosures as an act of 
responsiveness to social concerns and an expression of modern business ethics. On another 
level, by acknowledging the importance attributed to ethical values and social responsibility in 
geographical areas, banks may imitate other organizations’ “best practices” which encounter 
significant challenges and resort to CSR reports to signal out alignment with endorsed 
corporate behaviors and, thereby, confer legitimacy upon their role. We also demonstrate that 
the effect of religiosity on CSR disclosures is not significant in locales where corruption is 
higher since repeated patterns of questionable practices tend to promote the pursuance of 
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private gains, eroding community values such as collectivity and the common good. The level 
of corruption appears to impair the influence of religious norms upon communities, and 
corporate management is, therefore, less incentivized to instigate CSR reporting. 
The contribution of our study is twofold. First, we contribute to the current literature by 
synthesizing elements of the social norm and institutional theories to develop a theoretical 
framework which makes it possible to make sense of the impact of social norms on business 
activities. In particular, we draw attention to the a two-tier mechanism which, on one level, 
explains how management attitudes are affected by prevailing community and social values 
concerning corporate ethics and, on another level, how corporate institutions acknowledge the 
importance attributed to ethical values and social responsibility in geographical areas and resort 
to CSR reporting to demonstrate their adherence to endorsed corporate behaviors. Secondly, 
we advance an emerging branch of business research literature which seeks to make sense of 
the reasons underlying the employment of CSR disclosure strategies. More specifically, we 
extend the literature by demonstrating that informal institutions are significant drivers of CSR 
disclosure strategies. In this vein, we indicate the significant role of religious norms in paving 
the way for firm management to resort to CSR reports more intensively. Moreover, we extend 
current understandings by empirically showing that this relationship is bound to contextual 
characteristics. In this sense, we enrich current literature by illuminating the role of corruption 
in moderating the strength of religiosity on corporate CSR reporting. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we review prior 
literature and develop a theoretical framework and testable hypotheses. In the third section, we 
explain the data-collection procedure, proxy operationalization and the empirical model. The 
main results are reported in the fourth section, while the fifth section presents the sensitivity 
tests of our results. In the sixth and final section, we conclude the study. 
 
7 
2 Background and Hypotheses Development  
2.1 Religiosity and CSR disclosures 
We employ elements of social norm and institutional theories to decode the 
mechanisms through which contextual influences shape organizational policies of CSR 
reporting. Social norm theory has significantly contributed to the development of 
understandings with regard to how economic attitudes are shaped and institutionalized (Akerlof 
1980; Sunstein 1996). Social norms are referred to as prevailing codes of conduct which are 
shared by a group and constitute main driving forces and motivational mechanisms for 
individuals (Festré 2010). Endorsed patterns of behavior are usually enforced by sanctions and 
are ultimately sustained by emotions of guilt and shame, which enjoin members to forgo selfish 
motives for the benefit of the group (Festré 2010). Adherence to norms and peer-group 
expectations is associated with community approval and support, while deviant attitudes may 
bring about social discrimination. In the context of social norm theory, social approval and 
disapproval are understood as tools which facilitate the internalization of accepted attitudes and 
the realization of conformity as a moral obligation (Sunstein 1996). 
Previous research has demonstrated that social norms play a determining role in 
affecting individual economic behavior (Akerlof 1980). Decision making about work effort, 
consumption, bargains, contracts and countless others is influenced by the broader community 
beliefs, expectations and endorsed patterns of attitudes (Durlauf & Blume 2008). Interestingly, 
it has been underscored that prevailing social norms also constitute main motivational 
mechanisms for market participants who, under certain circumstances, consider that overriding 
the profit motive is a moral duty (Sunder 2005). Social norms are also determining forces for 
corporate decision making (Callen & Fang 2015; Dyreng et al. 2012; Hilary & Hui 2009). 
Broader community beliefs and expectations are reflected in organizational policies and 
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attitudes, as a result of managers’ operation in and interaction with local contexts and 
populations (McGuire et al. 2012). 
Through this perspective, great importance is attributed to religious norms, due to their 
significant role as crucial determinants of individual and corporate attitudes (Kanagaretnam, 
Lobo & Wang 2015; Stavrova, Fetchenhauer & Schlösser 2013). It has been substantiated that 
the degree of adherence to prevailing religious promulgations is associated with individual, as 
well as business, preferences and corporate decision making (Iannaccone 1998; Lehrer 2004). 
Religious spirituality and core promulgations, including the ideas that wealth “is instrumental 
and should serve higher human ends” and the existence of a “relationship of mutual 
responsibility between human beings and nature” (Melé & Fontrodona 2017, p. 671 and 673), 
remain at the heart of modern business ethics. Influential religions (inter alia, Buddhism, 
Christianity, Islam and Judaism) have provided a common set of beliefs, principles, criteria, 
guidelines for action and set of virtues which have been associated with “good” economic 
attitudes (Iannaccone 1998, p. 225; Melé & Fontrodona 2017; Shah & Rankin 2017). Further, 
in many cases, religious groups have exerted considerable influence in order to act against and 
disinvest from corporations whose activities deviate from the endorsed frame of ethics.3 
Organized religions uniformly promote an anti-manipulative ethos, are against 
opportunistic tactics (Callen & Fang 2015), and facilitate the development of ethical judgment 
(Walker, Smither & DeBode 2012) and morality (McGuire et al. 2012). Against this 
background, researchers have demonstrated that corporations develop more ethical business 
attitudes when they are headquartered in geographical areas characterized by strong religious 
norms (Dyreng et al. 2012). Most studies focusing on the impact of religious norms on 
                                                 
3 For example, bishops urged the Church of England to disinvest from ExxonMobil (Carrington 2017). See also 
Sharia compliance concerning Islamic finance at: http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=Islamic-corporate-social-
responsibility-(CSR) (Accessed 16 July, 2019). 
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managerial decisions substantiate that corporate headquarters are a central place where 
business decisions and policies are made (Pirinsky & Wang 2006; Rubin 2008). Additionally, 
the headquarters are where managers reside, meet and make decisions (Rubin 2008); and where 
information distribution and exchanges between the firm and various market participants take 
place (Pirinsky & Wang 2006).  
Social norm literature has provided analytical insights into how and why the level of 
religious adherence in a geographical area may influence manager attitudes (Callen & Fang 
2015; Dyreng et al. 2012; Hilary & Hui 2009). Firstly, firms tend to recruit a larger proportion 
of local people at all levels of the organization. Thus, firms located in counties marked by high 
religious adherence are likely to employ a larger proportion of religious people who may, in 
turn, exert influences which affect and shape management preferences and policies (Hilary & 
Hui 2009). Secondly, the literature underscores that employees and managers are usually 
attracted to specific organizations which share similar values (Holland 1976). The selection of 
an employer who has a congruent profile is expected to assist employees in achieving their 
valued outcomes (Schneider, Goldstein & Smith 1995). Finally, previous research has drawn 
attention to evidence that managers interact socially with local people and communities 
(Dyreng et al. 2012, p. 849). Thus, in areas where the level of religiosity is high, interaction 
facilitates familiarization with the prevailing religious beliefs and influences managers towards 
aligning their behavior with certain accepted patterns (Dyreng et al. 2012; McGuire et al. 2012). 
Managers are generally motivated to conform to the prevailing religious values for fear of being 
stigmatized in case of deviation since the cost of the social stigma often outweighs the potential 
pecuniary gains from engaging in non-endorsed activities (Callen & Fang 2015). 
We additionally employ institutional theory (Suchman 1995) to shed light upon the 
development of certain corporate policies and strategies as a result of dominant contextual 
characteristics. This perspective brings to the fore the role of institutional influences in creating 
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the conditions for the development of common organizational practices (Carpenter & Feroz 
2001; Dedoulis 2016; DiMaggio & Powell 1983). The term “mimetic isomorphism”, 
introduced by DiMaggio & Powell (1983),4 is central to understanding the underlying 
mechanism. It refers to organizations’ tendency to mimic the actions of other organizations, 
through which common corporate practices spillover. Firms seek to “morph” with broadly-
endorsed patterns in order to meet social expectations and attain, maintain and extend their 
social legitimacy (Carpenter & Feroz 2001). 
This process is frequently at work when industries encounter significant challenges 
which pose a latent threat to their organizational legitimacy (Grougiou et al. 2016). Such 
difficulties may involve extensive scrutiny of the sector’s workings by stakeholders, 
governments, non-governmental organizations, the media, academics and politicians 
(Grougiou et al. 2014). By adopting strategies which indicate the firm’s adherence to the 
prevailing system of norms, values and beliefs, organizations exhibit their commitment to 
broader expectations; and by doing so, they cement their position within the social context 
(Suchman 1995, p. 574). Hence, by mimicking other organizations, firms may pre-emptively 
prioritize the deployment of communication strategies to signal out their contextual 
congruence; thereby creating a protective shield, i.e., an image of a responsive organization 
which, in some cases, may even manipulate the informational needs of local constituencies 
(Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995). 
Corporate communication strategies often involve CSR, which is associated with 
religious social norms (Angelidis & Ibrahim 2004). This is because the very same virtues which 
                                                 
4 The authors identify three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic change: coercive, mimetic and normative 
(DiMaggio & Powell (1983). Coercive isomorphism captures broader organizational pressures on the focal 
organization to behave and structure itself in a certain way; i.e., legislative context. Normative isomorphism is 
associated with professionalization and refers to how a cognitive base, shared orientations and organizational 
practices are disseminated; i.e., codes of ethics and standards of practice introduced by professional organizations. 
Mimetic isomorphism is considered relevant for making sense of the subject under investigation.  
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underlie religious promulgations (i.e., protecting human rights, the idea of the common good 
and the notion of mutual responsibility between humans and nature) constitute the cornerstones 
of CSR (Melé & Fontrodona 2017). Christians, Muslims and Jews have established the 
“Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility” (www.iccr.org), through which action against 
controversial business practices can be instigated and a focus on local communities and the 
environment is actively encouraged (Interfaith Declaration 1994). Thus, CSR is broadly viewed 
as representing a well-established system of socially- and environmentally-endorsed corporate 
behaviors (Grougiou et al. 2016; Grougiou et al. 2014) which reflect aspects of modern 
business ethics (Angelidis & Ibrahim 2004). Thus, it is highly likely that, in religious areas, 
CSR disclosures are highly valued by a wide range of constituencies since they are interpreted 
as a manifestation of the integration of social and environmental expectations into corporate 
strategies (Doh & Guay 2006). 
2.2 The case of the banking industry and religiosity 
The banking sector is considered to be an important pillar of the global financial 
architecture (Grougiou et al. 2014). Banks contribute to the operation of businesses and the 
economy through their intermediating, financing and pricing activities (Scholtens 2009). 
However, banks’ operations are often characterized by opacity and significant information 
asymmetries and uncertainty (Furfine 2001) as a result of complex and diverse financial 
instruments, products and transactions (Heilpern, Haslam & Andersson 2009). Interestingly, 
this industry has placed considerable emphasis on building socially-responsible profiles. Many 
banking institutions are included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI),5 participate in 
groups that have established strict principles to ensure adherence to socially-responsible 
                                                 
5 Membership of the DJSI is acclaimed as an indication of leadership in terms of corporate sustainability. The 




investment activities (such as the Equator Principles group)6 (Chih et al. 2010) and are active 
in promoting their contribution to stakeholders and the wider public (Grougiou et al. 2014). 
Against this background, an understanding of the drivers of banks’ CSR-disclosure 
strategies is of major importance. On one level, based on the social norm perspective, the level 
of religiosity in a geographical area influences management choices and core financial 
decisions. Hence, it is expected that in highly-religious areas the prevailing norms would also 
sway bank managers towards initiating CSR disclosures, since social and environmental 
responsiveness is conceived of as an integral part of the modern business ethics endorsed by 
most organized religions. Indeed, previous literature shows that banks which operate in more 
religious areas in the U.S. are characterized by lower risk taking, are less prone to bankruptcy, 
and are less vulnerable to crises (Adhikari & Agrawal 2016). Further, banks in more religious 
locales appear to be more transparent and less likely to exhibit accounting irregularities 
(Dyreng et al. 2012; Hilary & Hui 2009). 
On the institutional level, banks’ unique characteristics attract scrutiny. Banks are 
accountable to a wide range of salient stakeholders, inter alia depositors (banks’ main funding 
source) and the government (the deposit-insurer), who have strong incentives to screen banks’ 
sustainability, operating activities and social contribution (see Mehran, Morrison & Shapiro 
2012). Moreover, publicly-traded banks are highly regulated, monitored by multiple agencies 
and are followed vigorously by the media and various watch-dog committees (Adhikari & 
Agrawal 2016). 
The banking sector also attracts negative press coverage as a result of the broader effects 
of its operations on society. The recent sub-prime mortgage crisis and the credit crunch that 
                                                 
6 Launched in 2003, the Equator Principles constitute a credit-risk management framework for determining, 
assessing and managing environmental and social risk in project finance transactions (http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about; Accessed 16 July, 2019). 
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followed provide evidence for this. Moreover, banks have been accused of various forms of 
inequity (such as gender discrimination and insider trading) and of financing operations or 
political regimes which cause significant environmental or social destruction (e.g., 
deforestation in Amazon; apartheid in South Africa) (Heal 2008). Banking organizations have 
also been convicted of various illegal activities, including: fake bids, rigged auctions, money 
laundering, tax evasion and the illegal use of confidential information (Heal 2008). 
In highly-religious contexts, banks constantly remain under the social microscope of 
value judgments from religious groups (Jizi et al. 2014). They are frequently denounced for 
financing companies whose products/services are not endorsed by organized religions. For 
instance, the latter have publicly opposed banks which have provided funding to companies 
engaged in activities related to abortion, pornography, gambling and alcohol (Grougiou et al. 
2016). Additionally, organized religions have expressed their concerns about the privileged 
treatment banks enjoy. Indicatively, Pope Francis, a very influential figure in Christianity, 
criticized the “scandalous sums” devoted to save banks from bankruptcy compared to the 
limited resources offered to the “bankruptcy of humanity” (Wooden 2016). 
Operating within contexts marked by a strong adherence to religious norms, banks are 
expected to employ CSR reporting as an attractive communication and legitimation device. 
CSR disclosures constitute a proactive strategy through which to demonstrate organizational 
conformity to prevailing values and commitment to broadly-endorsed patterns of economic 
attitudes; with the goal of promoting corporate interests and cushioning the impact of criticisms 
(Grougiou et al. 2014). By signaling out their responsiveness to wider expectations, banking 
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institutions strengthen their position and build a protective shield in geographical areas 
characterized by high religiosity.7 Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, religiosity increases the likelihood of a bank issuing a standalone 
CSR report. 
2.3 Corruption, religiosity and CSR disclosures 
Within the broader social norm literature, corruption (a trans-systemic phenomenon and 
set of practices) emerges as a catalytic external contextual element which affects individual 
and corporate behaviors (Zakaria 2018). Corruption constitutes an endemic feature even in 
contexts characterized by well-functioning systems of government and arguably-strong 
institutional structures (Neu et al. 2013). It is defined as the misuse of entrusted power and 
public office by individuals or organizations for private gain (Neu et al. 2013). Therefore, it 
results in a marginalization of societal needs and prioritization of individual or organizational 
self-rewarding goals (Arghyrou 2010) through, inter alia: questionable lobbying; intervention 
in the legislative process; blackmail and threats; unwritten agreements and conspiracies; and 
provision of funds and various resources to politicians, parties and other influential groups 
(Graycar & Monaghan 2015). 
Social norm theory provides insights into how questionable practices which acquire 
repetitive and potentially permanent characteristics can impair the effects of religious norms. 
At the heart of this process is the idea that the discomfort of becoming stigmatized for violating 
social norms is less intense in areas where there is a frequent violation of those norms by 
                                                 
7 Prior studies demonstrate that religious people are more conservative (Miller & Hoffmann 1995) and that 
religiosity significantly influences firms towards reporting more conservative earnings (Dyreng et al. 2012). 
Moreover, it has been shown that conservative individuals might not incentivize corporations regarding CSR 
(Ramasamy, Yeung & Au 2010), while conservative managers appear to prioritize costs for ensuring the reliability 
of financial reporting over costs for promoting CSR-related performance (Anagnostopoulou, Tsekrekos & 
Voulgaris 2019). Accordingly, since there is some early indication that conservatism is associated with less CSR 
performance, we cannot rule out the possibility that religiosity might be negatively associated with CSR reporting. 
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individuals and organizations (Lindbeck & Persson 2018). Repeated patterns of corruption 
exert influences and, through processes of social imitation, modeling and networking, such 
practices spill over, and they may be conceived of as normality (Köbis, Iragorri-Carter & Starke 
2018). As a consequence, in highly-corrupt contexts, pursuing opportunistic private gains to 
the detriment of the collective good is highly likely to be dissociated from emotions of shame, 
guilt and embarrassment (Köbis et al. 2018). Thus, it is expected that, in these contexts, bank 
managers may be less influenced by community ethical values, and they may show less 
dedication to keeping up with and initiating corporate collective actions such as CSR 
disclosures. 
Institutional theory also provides a background for understanding the influential effect 
of the level of corruption on corporate policy making. Operating within contexts where 
questionable practices emerge as established patterns of behaviors, firms may acknowledge 
that CSR reports might not be an efficient strategy to legitimize their organization’s activities. 
Thus, firms may be less willing to expend effort and allocate funds for CSR disclosures when 
the effectiveness of this strategy is called into question. Relevant literature illuminates the high 
cost associated with CSR disclosures (Barnea & Rubin 2010; Grougiou et al. 2016; 
McWilliams & Siegel 2001). As a result, banks may realize that the high costs associated with 
investing in CSR reports outweigh the potential benefits of this legitimation strategy. Hence, 
operating in highly-corrupt areas where CSR reports are less appealing but still costly, may 
lead banking institutions to be less interested in instigating CSR disclosures; which may, in 
turn, weaken the impact of religious norms on CSR decisions. Indeed, previous research 
provides evidence illuminating that, when making strategic decisions, banks do take into 
consideration aspects of the broader context within which they operate (Jiang, John, Li & Qian 
2018; Zakaria 2018). In light of the aforementioned rationales, which illuminate the importance 
of corruption as an external contextual factor, we hypothesize that: 
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H2: Ceteris paribus, the effect of religiosity on a bank issuing a standalone CSR report 
is higher in states with low corruption. 
3 Research design 
3.1 Data  
To test our predictions, we focus on a single country (the U.S.) since religiosity is 
confounded with the institutional characteristics of the country (Hilary & Hui 2009). We 
consider the period from 2002 onwards due to prior data restrictions for standalone CSR reports 
and stock-market data from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 and Orbis Bank Focus databases 
respectively. Following the relevant literature (i.e., Jizi et al. 2014), we only consider financial 
institutions which provide similar services and are subject to the same regulations and 
disclosure requirements; thus, we exclude credit unions, savings institutions and central reserve 
depositories. 
We began with 297 U.S. commercial banks from the Orbis Bank Focus database, which 
is covered by the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) Research & Analytics database. We 
further eliminated 4 banks with headquarters outside the U.S. by considering each bank’s 
location as the location of its headquarters (we obtained each bank’s historical headquarters 
addresses through its 10-K filings,8 similar to Hasan, Hoi, Wu & Zhang (2017)), since 
headquarters are usually close to a firm's core business activities (Pirinsky & Wang 2006). The 
data requirements for control and CSR performance variables for our main model (1) 
necessitated removing a further 755 observations due to missing data and 52 due to missing 
ownership-structure data available through the Thomson Reuters Eikon database. Our final 
sample comprised 214 banks, which translates into 1,785 firm-years, for which we retrieved 
                                                 
8 Databases tend to backfill business addresses and, thus, we obtain each firm’s historical business address through 
its 10-K filings. We download company filings, as available through the Securities Exchange Commission FTP 
server, and develop a PERL script that parses state code, state name, city, and zip code. 
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standalone CSR reporting activity from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4, 
CorporateRegister.com and CSRwire databases (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). 
3.2 Measuring religiosity and corruption 
Following relevant studies (e.g., Callen & Fang 2015; Dyreng et al. 2012; Jiang et al. 
2018), we operationalize our religiosity measure using data from the Religious Congregations 
and Membership Studies (RCMS), published by the Glenmary Research Center and distributed 
by the Association of Religion Data Archives (www.thearda.com). These data correspond to 
queries regarding the 285(296) U.S.-domiciled denominations listed in the Yearbook of 
American Churches in 2000(2010), concerning the number of churches, members and 
adherents per county. Out of the total denominations approached, 149(236) responded in 
2000(2010), reporting a total of 141.37(150.68) million adherents across all counties. Our 
religiosity proxy (REL) captures the degree of religiosity in the county of corporate 
headquarters (Hilary & Hui 2009). It is defined as the number of adherents in the county over 
the total population of the county (Leventis et al. 2018); though, we also conduct further 
sensitivity tests for alternative definitions of religiosity (see section 5.1). Intuitively, the larger 
the fraction of religious adherents in the county, the larger the influence of religious social 
norms on corporations located in the county. Since the RCMS are conducted at ten-year 
intervals, we linearly interpolate and extrapolate county-level estimates of religiosity between 
2000-2010 and 2010-2015 respectively (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2012; Hilary & Hui 2009; Jiang et 
al. 2018). Interpolating religiosity allows us to increase the power of our tests, as we can 
conduct our tests on a time series (see Hilary & Hui 2009) rather than on a single-year basis 
(2000 and 2010). 
Similar to prior studies, we measure corruption at the state level using the number of 
per-capita corruption convictions of local, state and federal officials (i.e., Butler, Fauver & 
 
18 
Mortal 2009; Husted, Jamali & Saffar 2016). We retrieve yearly data from the U.S. Department 
of Justice’s Public Integrity Section,9 an agency that oversees the federal effort to combat 
corruption through the prosecution of elected and appointed public officials at all levels of 
government, and we construct a corruption measure (CORRUPT) as the number of cases per 
state over the total population of the state times one million (Butler et al. 2009). We examine 
the impact of corruption by employing two tests: First, we use the year median of CORRUPT 
to classify states into high/low corruption and test whether the coefficient of REL is statistically 
different between the two groups. Second, we test the moderating role of corruption by 
interacting REL and CORRUPT (RELxCORRUPT). 
3.3 Empirical model 
Following prior studies, we frame key factors that may influence a firm’s decision to 
commit to CSR disclosure (i.e., Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Jizi et al. 2014). In order to examine the 
association between the probability of a bank issuing standalone CSR reports and religiosity, 
we employ a logistic regression using the following functional form of our model: 
log�prob(DCSR)/�1− prob(DCSR)�� = β0 + β1REL + β2PERF + β3GOV + β4BLOCK
+ β5CSRDENS + β6MKVAL + β7AGE + β8ROA + β9LEV + β10LIT
+ β11GLOBAL + β12POP + β13MEDAGE + β14EDUC + β15MALEMIN
+ β16URB + �YEAR + ε 
(1) 
The dependent variable in our model, DCSR, is set to 1 if the bank discloses a 
standalone CSR report (according to Thomson Reuters ASSET4, CorporateRegister.com 
and/or CSRwire databases) and 0 otherwise. The coefficient β1 in our model captures the 
                                                 
9 For more information on the Public Integrity Section, please visit: https://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin 
(Accessed 16 July, 2019). 
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impact of religiosity on CSR reporting (REL is calculated as described in Section 3.2). We also 
control for variables which, according to prior literature, are statistically related to CSR 
reporting (see Appendix for variable definitions). 
Prior studies support that CSR reporting is positively related to CSR performance 
(PERF) (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Grougiou et al. 2016) and strong corporate governance 
mechanisms (GOV) (Khan, Muttakin & Siddiqui 2013); while they document an inverse 
relationship with respect to the existence of concentrated ownership (BLOCK) (Harjoto & Jo 
2011). We measure PERF by totaling the positive (strengths) and negative (concerns) 
indicators of six KLD categories (i.e., community, diversity, employee relations, environment, 
human rights and product); while we exclude the category for corporate governance which is 
used as a proxy for corporate governance activity (GOV) (Grougiou et al. 2016). We proxy 
block ownership (BLOCK) by employing the sum of block holdings with more than 5% 
(Harjoto & Jo 2011). 
Recent studies highlight the importance of CSR engagement in areas proximal to a 
firm’s headquarters, stimulating researchers to control for local CSR density. Following Husted 
et al. (2016), we operationalize local CSR density (CSRDENS) as the spatial distribution of 
CSR engagement by firms surrounding the focal firm, as determined by the location of its 
headquarters. This approach captures both the location and level of CSR engagement by 
surrounding firms. As the number of firms active in CSR engagement in the local area around 
the focal firm increases, or as the level of their engagement increases, local CSR density 
increases.10 
                                                 
10 CSR engagement is proxied by aggregating five positive (strengths) indicators from the five KLD categories: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment and human rights; while we exclude the category for 
corporate governance and product, similar to Husted et al. (2016). We compute CSR density using the following 
formula: CSRDENSi =  ∑
KLDStrjt
�1+dij�j
, where: i refers to the focal firm; j to all other firms at year t; and d is the 
distance between firm i and firm j. 
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Large firms are more likely to behave in a socially-responsible way, as a result of their 
greater public visibility and pressures emanating from a wide group of stakeholders (Brammer, 
Pavelin & Porter 2009); whereas older firms tend to provide more CSR disclosures (Khan et 
al. 2013). We capture bank size (MKVAL) using the natural logarithm of the market value of 
common equity (Dhaliwal et al. 2011), and AGE using the natural logarithm of the number of 
years since the bank’s inception (Khan et al. 2013). We account for measures of financial 
performance (ROA) and leverage (LEV); defined as net income and total debt, respectively, 
both scaled by total assets (Jizi et al. 2014). Better financial performance may result in more 
available resources that can be invested in social-responsibility activities (Ioannou & Serafeim 
2012). On the other hand, firms with high leverage may exhibit a limited ability to fund CSR 
reporting initiatives since they generate and retain cash to serve their debt (Barnea & Rubin 
2010). 
Also, firms may strategically undertake disclosure initiatives to mitigate potential 
litigation risk (Skinner 1997). Interestingly, prior studies have embraced this notion and report 
a positive relationship between CSR reporting and risk (i.e., Deegan & Gordon 1996). We, 
therefore, include an indicator for litigation risk (LIT), signaling the existence/non-existence of 
a major11 legal proceeding against the firm under SEC regulation S-K §229.103 (Grougiou et 
al. 2016). We augment our model with an indicator variable signaling for foreign income 
reporting (GLOBAL), since previous studies document a positive relationship between 
corporate disclosure and a firm’s global orientation (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2011). 
We conclude our model specification by including geographic and demographic 
characteristics bound with religiosity. For example, Iannaccone (1998) considers gender, 
                                                 
11 According to SEC §229.103, “major” constitutes: a proceeding that, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds 
10% of the current assets of the company and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis; and/or a proceeding that 
refers to sanctions for environmental damages that exceed $100,000. 
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education, income, minority status and age as influential determinants of religious participation 
at the individual level. Therefore, it is crucial to moderate the influences arising from county-
level demographic traits. In our model, we control for: population (POP) (Leventis et al. 2018); 
median age of residents (MEDAGE) (McGuire et al. 2012); fraction of adults completing four 
years of college or higher (EDUC) (Leventis et al. 2018); and the fraction of male minority 
population (MALEMIN), all expressed as natural logarithms and measured at county-level. 
Data for these demographic characteristics were collected yearly for the entire estimation 
window of the study. To ensure the cross-sectional form of our dataset, we allow for variations 
across the county-level variables by measuring them in the county of corporate headquarters in 
each year. Finally, we control for bank location, since previous literature suggests that firms 
closer to major cities and financial centers are more likely to engage in CSR when compared 
with firms located in more remote areas (Husted et al. 2016). In particular, we include an 
indicator variable (URB) that equals 1 for banks headquartered in MSAs with at least 1 million 
residents (as defined by the U.S. Census (Leventis et al. 2018)), and 0 otherwise. To alleviate 
any concerns for unobserved effects, we incorporate year indicators in all our estimations to 
control for potential year effects (Dhaliwal et al. 2011) and we additionally sensitivity test for 
both county and year indicators to control for potential year and geographical effects at county 
level. 
4 Empirical findings 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample, where we winsorize all 
continuous model variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their respective distributions to 
reduce the effect of outliers. The mean of the dependent variable is 0.106, implying that around 
10% of our sample banks issue standalone CSR reports, and is comparable to the figures 
reported by relevant studies (i.e., Lu, Shailer & Yu 2017). The mean(median) of REL is 
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0.512(0.521) and is very close to the values reported in prior studies (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2012). 
Our sample banks exhibit modest CSR performance and governance activity, as the mean 
values of PERF and GOV are 0.534 and 0.127, respectively; while block holders control 
approximately 19% of total shares outstanding. The means of ROA and LEV are 1.004 and 
0.041, respectively, similar to prior studies (e.g., Jizi et al. 2014). The average bank age is 32 
years, while approximately 13% of banks have been involved in major litigation (LIT) and 
report non-zero foreign income (GLOBAL); all of which are comparable to Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011). With regards to the differences in the values of CSRDENS with those reported in Husted 
et al. (2016), these may be attributable to our focus on a single industry and our extended 
sample period (the authors cover the years 1998-2009). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
The results of the logistic regressions are summarized in Table 2, where we empirically 
test our expectations. We examine the impact of religiosity on CSR reporting in Column 1 and 
in Column 5 (where we further control for the per-capita corruption at state level - CORRUPT), 
while Columns 2-4 and 6 present the results on the moderating role of corruption. All regression 
models are significant (as Wald χ2 p<.001) and adequately fit the data (Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 
p>0.10 and the area under the ROC curve exceeds 0.90), while they exhibit explanatory powers 
that exceed 53.4%. The values of the VIFs are all lower than the conservative cut-off value of 
5 (Studenmund 2016), implying no multicollinearity. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Drawing upon Column 1 in Table 2, the coefficient of REL is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% (Column 1, β=4.251, z-stat=3.61), suggesting that a bank’s propensity to issue 
a standalone CSR report increases with the level of religiosity in the local community. With 
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respect to the regression coefficients of the control variables, our findings support the negative 
impact of ownership concentration on CSR engagement, since the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of BLOCK indicates that higher levels of block ownership discourage 
CSR (Jain & Jamali 2016). We further demonstrate that a bank’s propensity to disclose 
standalone CSR reports increases with firm size and age (see also Brammer et al. 2009); while 
the positive coefficient of LIT corroborates the notion that companies with higher litigation risk 
may strategically undertake CSR initiatives to mitigate reputational or other costs and preempt 
potential future lawsuits (Skinner 1997). Finally, we observe that the propensity for CSR 
disclosure is related to the location of headquarters since disclosures increase when firms are 
located in denser areas (URB). We find that CSR reporting is stronger in more CSR-proactive 
locales (Husted et al. 2016) which provides further validation of our main argument that CSR 
reporting is determined by social expectations and isomorphism12. Overall, our results support 
prior literature as regards the determinants of CSR disclosures and suggest that previously-
developed CSR reporting models (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2011) should pay additional attention to 
external factors such as social norms, and in particular the intensity of religious adherence. 
To test the role of corruption, we divide our sample states into high/low corruption (see 
Columns 2-4 in Table 2), using the sample’s median of CORRUPT for each year. In accordance 
with our expectations, the coefficient of REL is statistically significant at 1% for banks located 
in less-corrupt states (Column 2, β=8.341, z-stat=3.40), while it is statistically insignificant for 
banks located in the highly-corrupt states. Our results indicate that lower levels of state 
corruption are associated with a greater influence of religiosity on CSR reporting activity. We 
also test for homogeneity in the pairwise-estimated coefficients across models (using a Wald 
                                                 
12 We thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
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test in Column 4), where we observe that the difference in the coefficients of REL is statistically 
significant at 1% across subsamples. 
We repeat the above analysis and further test the moderating role of corruption by 
including CORRUPT as a control variable (Column 5 in Table 2) and, most importantly, 
including the interaction term between REL and CORRUPT in the main model (Column 6 in 
Table 2). In line with our expectations and previously reported findings RELxCORRUPT is 
negative and statistically significant at 5% (β=-0.484, z-stat=2.24), suggesting that higher 
levels of corruption moderate the positive impact of religiosity on CSR reporting activity. 
Figure 1 describes how high levels of corruption are associated with low levels of religious 
adherence, which then moderates the positive effect of religiosity on CSR reporting 
engagement. In this plot, we mean-center13 REL and CORRUPT to ease the interpretation of 
the interaction term (e.g., Burks et al. 2019; Dawson 2014). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
5 Sensitivity testing 
5.1 Alternative measure of religiosity 
Given that there are various ways to measure religiosity (Hood, Hill & Spilka 2009), 
we create alternative proxies of religiosity by drawing upon data from the Pew Research 
Center14 (similar to Leventis et al. 2018). We rely on the Religious Landscape Survey,15 which 
                                                 
13 Burks, Randolph & Seida (2019, p. 72) argue that mean-centering the constituents of the interaction term does 
not change the coefficient on the interaction effect; rather, it enables the researcher to “meaningfully interpret” 
the main effect. 
14 For more information on the Pew Forum, please visit: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/29/how-
religious-is-your-state/ (Accessed 16 July, 2019). 
15 The Pew Research Center’s Religious Landscape Studies are telephone surveys conducted from May 8 to 
August 13, 2007 and from June 4 to September 30, 2014. The survey was conducted by Abt SRBI, Princeton 
Survey Research Associates International (PSRAI) and Social Science Research Solutions (SSRS), between 




was conducted in the summer of 2007(2014) and employs a representative sample of 
35,957(35,071) adults at state level. Respondents to these surveys provided answers on: (a) the 
importance of religion in their lives; (b) the frequency of attendance at worship services; (c) 
the frequency of prayer; and (d) the absolute certainty of belief in God.16 After deriving data 
on these four questions, we linearly interpolate them to fill in the missing years (2008-2013), 
similar to our main religiosity proxy (see Section 3.2). Next, we rank states (in descending 
order, so that a higher rank indicates more positive answers) and create our alternative measures 
of religiosity, namely: importance of religion (IMPR); worship attendance frequency (WORR); 
frequency of prayer (FRPR); and belief in God (BELR). We further create a comprehensive 
measure of the aforementioned ranks using a first principal component analysis for each year 
(RELRFPC). 
We conduct additional analyses for the period from 2007 to 2014 using the five 
alternative specifications of our main religiosity proxy. The coefficients of the alternative 
religiosity measures are positive and fulfill all conventional levels of statistical significance; 
with IMPR, BELR and RELRFPC being statistically significant at 1% and WORR and FRPR 
being statistically significant at 5%. Overall, our results appear to be robust for alternative 
specifications of religiosity and are supportive of our hypothesis, since they suggest that 
religiosity increases a bank’s propensity to engage in CSR reporting through issuing standalone 
CSR reports. 
                                                 
16 The questions capturing the four dimensions of religiosity are: (a) “How important is religion in your life? Very 
important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?”; (b) “Aside from weddings and 
funerals, how often do you attend religious services? More than once a week, once a week, once or twice a month, 
a few times a year, seldom, or never?”; (c) “People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending 
religious services, do you pray: several times a day, once a day, a few times a week, once a week, a few times a 
month, seldom, or never?”; and (d) “Do you believe in God or a universal spirit?”. For further details, please visit 
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2016/10/25142557/RLS-II-Questionnaire-for-5th-
release.pdf (Accessed 16 July, 2019). 
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5.2 Alternative measures of CSR disclosure 
For thoroughness reasons, we employ three alternative specifications for CSR 
disclosures in addition to our CSR disclosure proxy (DCSR). Firstly, we employ an indicator 
for the CSR report being compliant with GRI standards (GRI_COMP).17 Secondly, we use a 
binary variable capturing first-time CSR reporters (DCSR_FIRST) (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). 
Thirdly, we use the actual number of CSR reports (NR_DCSR) issued by the company in year 
t. We perform a logistic regression using GRI_COMP and DCSR_FIRST as dependent 
variables and an ordered logistic regression using NR_DCSR. Through this process, we obtain 
results qualitatively similar to those based on DCSR, since the coefficient of REL remains 
positive and statistically significant at 1%. 
5.3 Alternative measures of CSR performance 
We test for alternative measures of CSR performance by treating the “strengths” 
(PERF_Str) and the “concerns” (PERF_Con) data as separate sets, similar to Grougiou et al. 
(2016). We also test for an alternative definition of CSR performance, as presented in Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011). We create an indicator CRO that equals 1 if a firm was on the “100 Best Corporate 
Citizens” list (by Corporate Responsibility Officer) in year t, and 0 otherwise (Dhaliwal et al. 
2011). When we rerun the regressions employing these proxies, our inferences remain 
unchanged. 
5.4 Alternative sampling and modelling  
To verify the validity of our main results, we rerun our analyses to ensure that they are 
not dependent on the interpolation of the main dependent variables (McGuire et al. 2012). Thus, 
we limit the sample to 2010 for the most recent RMCS data; and to both 2007 and 2014 for the 
                                                 
17 We collected data on the GRI compliance of CSR reports through two sources: a) the Thomson Reuters EIKON 
database, and b) the Sustainability Disclosure Database. 
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Religious Landscape Survey data. Although religiosity measures are positive, and levels of 
statistical significance remain unaffected for the Religious Landscape Survey data, statistical 
significance for the RMCS data drops to 5%. We also conduct additional tests and adopt a lead-
lag approach, similar to Dhaliwal et al. (2011). We do so to address potential endogeneity and 
self-selection issues related to CSR disclosure and religiosity. Running our analyses and 
employing lagged values for all control variables does not change our inferences. Further, we 
rerun our analysis using county and year effects to control for potential timing and geographical 
effects. However, our inferences remain unchanged. 
5.5 Variable omission 
We repeat our analysis employing various factors that have been found or suggested 
(explicitly or implicitly) to be influential to CSR reporting, but were omitted from our main 
model due to data and/or specification reasons. First, we repeat our tests employing alternative 
size measures, namely: 1) the natural logarithm of total assets (Khan et al. 2013); 2) the natural 
logarithm of sales/revenues (Grougiou et al. 2016); and 3) the natural logarithm of number of 
employees (Lau, Lu & Liang 2016). All three size measures attract positive and highly 
significant coefficients, while our inferences remain unchanged. Second, we replace our 
performance measure, namely ROA, with the ratio of net income over net assets (ROE) 
(Grougiou et al. 2016). Although our inferences remain unaffected, and the coefficient of ROE 
retains the same direction with ROA, the statistical significance of ROE rises to the 1% level. 
Third, considering that stable firms with lower risk are more prone to engage in CSR activities 
(Ioannou & Serafeim 2012), we incorporate two measures for future growth opportunities, 
namely: TOBINQ, defined as the market value of common equity plus the book value of 
preferred stock, book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, scaled by the book value 
of total assets (Dhaliwal et al. 2011); and the market-to-book ratio (MB) (Grougiou et al. 2016). 
Both coefficients are statistically insignificant, while the coefficient of REL remains positive 
 
28 
and statistically significant at 1%. We also control for market risk using BETA, since CSR may 
represent managerial effort to influence stakeholder perceptions of firm risk (Jizi et al. 2014). 
Once again, the significance of the coefficients of our main dependent variables remains 
unchanged. 
We further test the robustness of our results and control for the following variables. 
First, we consider bank visibility (Ioannou & Serafeim 2012) and incorporate the number of 
analysts following the stock (ANALYST) and the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
analysts (LnANALYST). Second, we incorporate a variable capturing the quality of the legal 
system (JDQ) (Ioannou & Serafeim 2012), operationalized as the overall state rankings 
reported in the State Liabilities Rankings Study, which was conducted for the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce (2002). Third, we include the social capital at county level where the bank is 
headquartered (Jha & Cox 2015), constructed as per Rupasingha & Goetz (2008). Fourth, we 
augment our model with an indicator variable that equals 1 if the Republican Party won the 
most recent presidential elections at state level (REPUB_ST), to control for any effect due to 
political affiliation (Di Giuli & Kostovetsky 2014). The inclusion of the aforementioned control 
variables does not alter our inferences, as the coefficient of REL remains positive and 
statistically significant at 1%. 
We further consider alternative measures of ownership structure, since prior literature 
suggests that CSR engagement and reporting differ in relation to levels of concentrated and 
institutional ownership (Höllerer 2013). Therefore, we operationalize concentrated ownership 
using an indicator (CONC_OWN25) for shareholders having at least a 25% stake of total firm 
shares (Höllerer 2013); in addition, we offer an alternative cutoff point of a 20% stake of total 
firm shares. Our results corroborate the notion that ownership concentration discourages CSR 
engagement, since both coefficients attain a negative sign and statistical significance at 10% 
and 5% respectively, while our other inferences remain unchanged. We also control for the 
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percentage of shares owned by insider (INSID) and institutional investors (INST) (Grougiou et 
al. 2016) but fail to establish any relationship with standalone CSR reporting. We also test 
whether the financial crisis affects the association between REL and CSR reporting. Employing 
multiple tests for crisis and post-crisis eras, REL remains highly significant while other 
inferences do not change. Interestingly, we do find that banks increase their CSR reporting 
during and after the crisis, potentially to legitimize themselves and to follow social 
expectations. 
Finally, we re-estimate our analysis using additional demographic characteristics which 
were excluded from our main model either due to availability at state- rather than county-level 
or due to being highly correlated with the variables in our model. Specifically, we control for: 
marriage rates in the state (MAR); and the natural logarithm of the average per-capita county 
income at county level (INC)18 (Hilary & Hui 2009; Iannaccone 1998). We obtain state-level 
marriage rates from the Center of Disease Control19 (Dyreng et al. 2012), and per-capita income 
figures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Finally, we include an indicator (UAGG) for 
bank headquarters located in one of the following MSAs: New York City, Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Washington, Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas, and 
Houston (Dyreng et al. 2012; Leventis et al. 2018). Including the aforementioned variables 
separately in our model does not affect our inferences. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate whether an important feature of the institutional context, 
namely religiosity, affects CSR disclosure strategies and whether this relationship is mitigated 
                                                 
18 For instance, per-capita income is highly and significantly correlated with EDUC, with a correlated coefficient 
of 0.83. Thus, we repeat our analyses including INC in our model and exclude EDUC. 
19 For more information on the Center of Disease Control please visit: https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage-
divorce.htm (Accessed 16 July, 2019). 
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by corruption. We find that the level of religiosity is positively associated with banks’ CSR-
reporting practices, a result that becomes more resilient in less-corrupt locales. 
In light of social norm and institutional theories, we argue that, in areas where 
adherence to religious norms is strong, a two-tier mechanism is at work. On one level, as a 
result of their social and professional interaction with individuals and institutions, bank 
managers become familiarized with and internalize prevailing beliefs and values. This process 
facilitates the development of certain understandings that bring about an alignment of 
management attitudes and corporate policies with endorsed patterns of behaviors. Hence, the 
deployment of voluntary CSR reporting, which is interpreted as an expression of modern 
business ethics, enables bank managers to demonstrate their respect for the common good and 
collectivity, both of which are highly valued by local communities. 
On another level, highly-religious contexts give rise to additional challenges for bank 
management, whose activities and operations become subject to scrutiny by a wide range of 
social constituencies, including religious groups. The emphasis placed upon ethical values in 
these geographical areas may lead bank managers, who might not necessarily share such 
values, to resort to CSR reporting in order to promote an image of organizational 
responsiveness to broader expectations. This strategy creates a protective shield, lessens the 
possibility of organizational stigmatization and, at the same time, confers legitimacy upon 
banks, strengthening their position in highly-religious local communities. 
In addition, we argue that the effect of religiosity on the instigation of CSR reporting 
becomes less significant in highly-corrupt locales. In geographical areas where the pursuance 
of opportunistic private gains is prioritized over values such as the common good and 
collectivity, questionable practices may acquire a repetitive character through imitation and 
social modeling, and patterns of corrupt behaviors are highly likely to be conceived of as 
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normality. In such contexts, messages contradictory to religious norms are signaled out and 
create a backdrop against which bank managers may consider it less important to keep up with 
social and environmental values; thus, they may be reluctant to devote valuable resources to 
instigate CSR reports, since their legitimation appeal would be limited. 
The contribution of our study is two-fold. First, we contribute to extant literature by 
providing a theoretical backdrop for making sense of the impact of social norms on business 
activities. More specifically, we illuminate the two-tier mechanism at work on the individual 
and institutional level which lead banking institutes to the employment of CSR reporting. 
Secondly, we contribute to the literature by drawing attention to religious social norms as an 
important informal institution, which enhances the initiation of CSR reporting at the banking 
industry level. We additionally expand current understandings by elucidating the role of 
corruption as a statistically-significant moderator of the impact of religiosity on CSR reporting. 
Analysts and market participants should be aware that the initiation of CSR reporting may be 
a strategy dependent on the prevailing norms and idiosyncrasies of local societies as shown by 
our findings regarding religiosity and corruption; this should therefore be factored into their 
analyses.  
We note some limitations which, however, may inspire future research. Our data is 
limited to U.S. listed banks and so is geographically bound. Researchers could employ cross-
country datasets in order to achieve results which could be broadly applicable. Moreover, future 
research could expand the sectorial scope of our investigation. Additionally, it would be 
interesting to know what tangible benefits are enjoyed by U.S. banks issuing CSR reports in 
religious contexts. Relevant areas for such an investigation might include corporate image, 
labor relations, media exposure and the cost of capital. While we have followed an established 
method for measuring CSR disclosure by employing standalone CSR reports, we acknowledge 
that there are alternative channels through which companies disclose relevant information, such 
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as 10-K filings, annual reports, firm websites, media and public announcements. These are not 
captured by our data. Future studies could, therefore, extend our findings by considering the 
examination of alternative CSR communication channels. There is only very limited research 
on the effect of conservatism on CSR performance and on how this association or/and the effect 
of conservatism alone might be an influential mechanism that moderates the impact of 
religiosity on CSR reporting. This effect might be different in locales with different social 
norms, culture and formal institutions. We suggest that this area is an important avenue for 
further research. Finally, current understandings of CSR-reporting practices in religious and 
corrupt locales could be further enriched by employing behavioral and organizational 
frameworks, and by employing alternative research methods such as in-depth interviews and 
projective techniques to shed light upon the two-tier mechanism and its importance. 
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Indicator variable that equals 1 if bank discloses a CSR report (according to 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4, CorporateRegister.com and CSRwire databases) and 0 
otherwise. 
Main independent variables: 
REL 
Number of adherents in the county in which the bank is headquartered (as reported 
by the 2000 and 2010 RCMS studies), divided by the county population as per the 
U.S. census. (Source: Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA)). 
CORRUPT 
The ratio of the total number of convictions of local, state and federal officials over 
the total population of the state times one million. (Source: U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Public Integrity Section). 
Firm-level variables: 
PERF 
Measure of social performance defined as the total positive (strengths) and negative 
(concerns) of six CSR rating categories: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights and product. (Source: KLD). 
GOV 
Corporate governance performance defined as the total positive (strengths) and 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics. 
Variable N Min 25th Mean Median 75th Max StDev 
DCSR 1,785 0 0 0.106 0 0 1 0.308 
REL 1,785 0.249 0.414 0.512 0.521 0.6 0.957 0.122 
PERF 1,785 -5 -1 0.534 0 1 14 2.044 
GOV 1,785 -3 0 0.127 0 1 1 0.758 
BLOCK 1,785 0 8.48 18.74 16.9 25.863 89.953 14.573 
CSRDENS 1,785 1.119 3.71 13.905 5.987 13.342 182.298 22.266 
MKVAL 1,785 3.375 5.994 7.172 6.814 7.893 12.401 1.656 
AGE 1,785 1.099 2.89 3.239 3.258 3.611 5.352 0.682 
ROA 1,785 -2.778 0.745 1.004 1.01 1.283 14.176 0.834 
LEV 1,785 0 0.01 0.041 0.02 0.041 0.467 0.06 
LIT 1,785 0 0 0.137 0 0 1 0.344 
GLOBAL 1,785 0 0 0.131 0 0 1 0.338 
POP 1,785 10.146 12.073 13.025 13.274 13.849 16.135 1.342 
MEDAGE 1,785 3.347 3.573 3.627 3.622 3.679 3.965 0.091 
EDUC 1,785 2.514 3.262 3.468 3.462 3.73 4.192 0.354 
MALEMIN 1,785 0.943 2.539 2.956 3.148 3.496 4.22 0.72 
URB 1,785 0 0 0.294 0 1 1 0.456 
CORRUPT 1,785 0 1.878 3.305 2.811 4.118 26.386 2.293 
Note: All numbers are rounded to the third decimal place. Variables are described in the Appendix. 
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Table 2 CSR reporting, religiosity, the impact of religiosity in states with above/below the sample year 
median of per-capita convictions of local, state and federal officials, and the joint effect of religiosity and 
corruption  (Dependent variable = DCSR) – logit analysis. 
Variables 












REL 4.251*** 0.030 8.341*** -8.311*** 4.061*** 5.897*** 
 (3.61) (0.01) (3.40) (6.755) (3.40) (3.58) 
CORRUPT . . . . 0.059 0.312*** 
     (1.15) (3.03) 
RELxCORRUPT . . . . . -0.484** 
      (-2.24) 
PERF 0.075 0.065 0.124 -0.059 0.072 0.072 
 (1.42) (0.78) (1.62) (0.272) (1.35) (1.36) 
GOV -0.150 0.250 -0.393 0.643* -0.155 -0.133 
 (-0.90) (1.07) (-1.45) (3.237) (-0.93) (-0.80) 
BLOCK -0.032*** -0.042** -0.016 -0.026 -0.032*** -0.032*** 
 (-3.52) (-2.32) (-1.21) (1.318) (-3.50) (-3.52) 
CSRDENS 0.034*** 0.003 0.065*** -0.062*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 (5.38) (0.17) (6.04) (9.96) (5.27) (5.33) 
MKVAL 0.864*** 1.240*** 1.421*** -0.181 0.873*** 0.875*** 
 (5.66) (5.28) (6.88) (0.337) (5.75) (5.73) 
AGE 0.574*** 0.766*** -0.057 0.823** 0.581*** 0.571*** 
 (3.41) (2.74) (-0.23) (4.875) (3.43) (3.39) 
ROA -0.260 -0.589*** 0.155 -0.743*** -0.269 -0.251 
 (-0.78) (-2.61) (1.04) (7.588) (-0.80) (-0.80) 
LEV -0.656 0.331 -6.422*** 6.753** -0.583 -0.654 
 (-0.43) (0.16) (-2.99) (5.178) (-0.38) (-0.43) 
LIT 0.526** 0.374 0.173 0.2 0.493* 0.505* 
 (2.04) (0.88) (0.35) (0.096) (1.91) (1.95) 
GLOBAL 0.563* 1.306*** 0.198 1.107 0.588** 0.592** 
 (1.89) (2.72) (0.42) (2.695) (1.96) (1.99) 
POP 0.188** 0.089 -0.331** 0.42 0.205** 0.187* 
 (2.07) (0.43) (-1.99) (2.495) (2.08) (1.91) 
MEDAGE 0.140 -0.105 -3.606 3.501 0.053 0.166 
 (0.09) (-0.04) (-1.46) (1.02) (0.03) (0.11) 
EDUC -1.959*** 2.606** -5.496*** 8.102*** -1.845*** -1.923*** 
 (-2.85) (2.39) (-5.99) (32.39) (-2.61) (-2.69) 
MALEMIN -0.109 -0.438 0.565* -1.002** -0.156 -0.047 
 (-0.63) (-1.39) (1.76) (4.971) (-0.85) (-0.25) 
URB 0.682*** 0.859** 1.162*** -0.304 0.708*** 0.733*** 
 (2.97) (1.97) (2.75) (0.251) (3.05) (3.15) 
(intercept) -11.801* -25.981** 13.600 . -12.148* -13.359** 
 (-1.80) (-2.48) (1.51)  (-1.85) (-2.01)         
Year effects Included Included Included . Included Included 
Wald χ2 283.953 184.054 196.573 . 288.247 293.156 
Pseudo R2 0.534 0.618 0.609 . 0.534 0.536 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 10.961 8.056 2.636 . 9.303 11.303 
Area under the ROC 
curve 
0.947 0.965 0.966 . 0.947 0.947 
Mean VIF 1.630 1.634 1.779 . 1.621 3.431 
Observations 1,785 971 814  . 1,785 1,785 
Note: Standard errors are corrected using the Huber-White procedure and z-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. Values with asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively (2-tailed). All numbers are rounded to the third decimal place. The Column 4 reports the t-statistics 
for the Wald tests used to compare difference in coefficients between regression results of Columns 2 and 3. 




Figure 1 Interaction effect of religiosity and corruption on CSR reporting 
 
